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Abstract There are two behavioral approaches to addiction: rational and irrational. The 
rational approach assumes that addicts have higher time preference rates and lower risk 
aversion coefficients—parameters that are interpreted as impulsive preferences. On the 
other hand, the irrational approach argues that addiction is a consequence of anomalies 
such as non-expected utility and hyperbolically discounted utility. This paper integrates 
these two approaches and concludes that anomaly and impulsivity complementarily 
account for addiction. 
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  Why do people suffer from such addictions as smoking and gambling? We analyze 
this problem with the help of the following two models1
  The second is the irrational addiction model, such as the one incorporated in the study 
by Gruber and Koszegi (2001), where the exponentially discounted and expected utility 
hypotheses are systematically violated; individuals neither recognize the true difficulty 
of quitting nor search for self-control devices to help them quit. Gruber and Koszegi 
developed a new model of addictive behavior that incorporated anomalies such as 
time-inconsistency
. The first is the rational 
addiction model advocated by Becker and Murphy (1988), where a consumer is 
assumed to think that an addictive product such as cigarettes increases her current 
satisfaction but decreases her future utility by damaging her health, and then determine 
the optimum consumption levels. The rational addiction model is compatible with 
traditional economic models such as the discounted and expected utility schemes. Ida 
and Goto (2009 in press) verified empirically that impulsive people—those with higher 
time preference rates and lower risk aversion coefficients—were more likely to be 
addicted to smoking. We call this the weak rationality approach to addiction. 
2
  Are the two approaches related? Are they complementary or substitutes, if related? 
These questions will be investigated in this paper. It is also important to verify whether 
an addict is both impatient and time-inconsistent; and whether a risk-seeker is likely to 
violate the expected utility hypothesis. Very few studies, however, have been conducted 
in this vein. An exception is Blondel et al. (2007), who compared the behavior of drug 
addicts with that of a control group and discovered that the decisions of the drug users, 
over time and under risk, were not less consistent with standard decision-making 
theories. Furthermore, they found no differences in the estimated discount rates between 
, and also included strikingly different normative implications, since 
government policy should consider not only the externalities that smokers impose on 
others but also the internalities imposed by smokers on themselves. We call this the 
irrationality (or bounded rationality) approach. 
                                               
1Tomer (2001) also discussed addiction from a socio-economic perspective. We will 
come back to the socio-economic model, based on our estimation results. 
2Wong (2008) found that time-inconsistent behavior is associated with the inferior class 




the drug users and the control group, but the former did appear to be more risk seeking. 
These conclusions are interesting, although the size of the sample was only 34. 
Expanding on the work of Blondel et al. (2007), we draw a large population to examine 
the relation between the irrationality (anomaly) and the weak rationality (impulsivity) 
approaches. 
  This paper establishes three hypotheses. First, we investigate whether anomalies such 
as non-discounted and non-expected utilities are associated with higher time preference 
rates or higher risk aversion coefficients. We conclude that discounted utility anomalies 
can be explained by the immediacy effect, resulting in higher time preference rates; 
expected utility anomalies can be interpreted as outcomes of the certainty effect, 
resulting in higher risk aversion coefficients.  
  Second, we investigate whether smokers who exhibit discounted and expected utility 
anomalies have higher time preference rates and lower risk aversion coefficients than 
non-smokers who show evidence of the same anomalies. We obtain the expected results. 
Ida and Goto (2009 in press) reported that time preference rates were higher and risk 
aversion coefficients were lower for smokers. This result holds when the discounted and 
expected utility anomalies are observed. We thus conclude that anomaly (i.e., time 
inconsistency) and impulsivity (i.e., myopia) are complementary rather than alternating. 
  Third, we apply our analysis to such forms of gambling as pachinko (a type of 
Japanese pinball) in order to examine instances of process dependence, as opposed to 
the substance dependence inspected earlier. We obtain results similar to those for 
smoking while measuring the time preference rates of pachinko players. We thus 
conclude that the complementarities between anomaly and impulsivity apply widely for 
addictive behaviors, although we see different results in the case of the risk aversion 
coefficients. This is probably because the discounted utility anomaly is associated with 
the immediacy effect (higher time preference rates), while the expected utility anomaly 
is related to the certainty effect (lower risk aversion coefficients). 
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the discounted and expected 
utility anomalies, and Section 3 presents our adopted anomaly survey. Section 4 
explains a method that simultaneously measures time preference rates and risk aversion 
coefficients. Section 5 displays the estimation results. Section 6 illustrates the 
relationship between anomaly and impulsivity for all samples. Sections 7 and 8 discuss 




socio-economic type argument for irrational addiction on the basis of the estimation 
results. Section 10 outlines our conclusions.  
 
2. Expected and Discounted Utility Anomalies 
 
2.1 The Discounted Utility Anomaly 
 
  First, we explain the discounted utility anomaly. The standard theory of 
decision-making over time is the exponentially discounted utility model advocated by 
Samuelson (1937)3
  Given that X and Y denote payoffs (X < Y) and t and s denote time delay (t < s), 
stationarity is more formally defined as follows: 
. Its key assumption is a stationarity axiom, which means that if and 
only if the utility of JPY 100,000 at present is indifferent to the utility of JPY 150,000 in 
one year, then the utility of JPY 100,000 in ten years is indifferent to the utility of JPY 
150,000 in eleven years. 
 
(X,t) ≥  (Y,s) ⇔  (X,t+ε) ≥  (Y,s+ε) 
Note that ε is a positive constant. 
 
  At this point, the discounted utility model demonstrates U(X)/(1 + r)t ≥  U(Y)/(1 + 
r)s for t and s4
 
. However, the discounted utility anomaly of a present-smaller reward 
being excessively preferred to a delayed-larger reward indicates the following 
inconsistent preference orders: 
 (X,t) ≥  (Y,s) ⇔  (X,t + ε) ≤  (Y,s + ε). 
 
This anomaly is called time inconsistency (Strotz 1956) 5
                                               
3The exponentially discounted utility model was axiomatically defined by Koopmans 
(1960) and Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982). 
, which is interestingly 
4For continuous time, the exponentially discounted utility model is represented by 
exp(-rt)U(X) ≥  exp(-rs)U(Y). 
5A model considers a decreasing discount rate as hyperbolically discounting, which is 




observed even for animals, including pigeons (Ainslie 1975).  




Alternative 1: Receive JPY 100,000 immediately. 
Alternative 2: Receive JPY 150,000 in X years. 
What X makes the two alternatives indifferent? 
 
Question 2 
Alternative 1: Receive JPY 100,000 in one year. 
Alternative 2: Receive JPY 150,000 in Y years. 
What Y makes the two alternatives indifferent? 
 
Note that given US$1 = JPY 110, JPY 100,000 equals US$909, while JPY 150,000 
is US$1,364. 
 
  Based on the exponentially discounted utility model, when the utility of JPY 100,000 
at present equals the utility of JPY 150,000 in X years, we obtain the following 
equation: 
 
Utility of JPY 100,000 = Utility of JPY 150,000/(1 + r)X 
Note that r denotes the annual time preference rate. 
 
On the other hand, when the utility of JPY 100,000 in one year equals the utility of JPY 
150,000 in Y years, we obtain the following equation: 
 
Utility of JPY 100,000 /(1 + s) = Utility of JPY 150,000 /(1 + s)Y. 
 
If the time preference rate is constant (r = s), as the exponentially discounted utility 
model assumes, then X = Y – 1 holds. However, the discounted utility anomaly X/(Y – 1) 
< 1 is frequently observed, so the time preference rate decreases for time delay (r > s). 




emphasis on an immediate reward as opposed to a delayed one (Fredrick et al. 2000). In 
Question 1, since Alternative 1 includes an immediate reward, Alternative 2 requires 
that X be a relatively small figure (for example, one year). On the other hand, in 
Question 2, since Alternative 1 includes a one-year-delayed reward, Alternative 2 
requires that Y be a large figure (for example, three years). Thus, it follows that X/(Y – 
1) = 0.5.  
 
2.2 Expected Utility Anomaly 
 
  Next we explain the expected utility anomaly. The standard theory of 
decision-making under risk is the expected utility model advocated by Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1953). The key assumption of this theory is the independence axiom, 
which means that if lottery X is preferred to lottery Y, mixing lotteries X and Y by third 
irrelevant lotteries W and Z with a common probability 1-P, preserves the preference 
orders: 
 
(X, P; Z, 1-P) > (Y, P; Z, 1-P) ⇔  (X, P; W, 1-P) > (Y, P; W, 1-P). 
 
  We asked respondents two questions to investigate the expected utility anomaly: 
 
Question 1 
Alternative 1: Receive a guaranteed JPY 100,000. 
Alternative 2: Receive JPY 200,000 by X%. 
What X makes the two alternatives indifferent? 
 
Question 2 
Alternative 1: Receive JPY 100,000 by 50%. 
Alternative 2: Receive JPY 200,000 by Y%. 
What Y makes the two alternatives indifferent? 
 






  Based on the expected utility model, when the utility of JPY 100,000 by 100% equals 
the utility of JPY 150,000 by X %, we obtain the following equation: 
 
Utility of JPY 100,000 = X/100 ×  Utility of JPY 150,000. 
  
 Based on the expected utility model, the preference between Alternatives 1 and 2 is 
preserved when dividing them by a common ratio. For example, when the utility of JPY 
100,000 by 50% equals the utility of JPY 200,000 by Y%, we obtain the relationship X 
= 2Y. However, the expected utility anomaly, 2Y/X < 1, is frequently observed. This is 
called the common ratio effect or the violation of the independence axiom (Allais 1953). 
A main reason for this is the certainty effect, whereby people markedly prefer an 
assured reward in comparison to a risky reward (Starmer 2000). In Question 1, since 
Alternative 1 is a certain reward, Alternative 2 requires that X be a relatively large value 
(for example, 0.8). On the other hand, in Question 2, since Alternative 1 includes a risk 
(with probability 0.5), Alternative 2 requires that Y be a small value (for example, 0.3). 
Thus, it follows that 2Y/X = 0.75. 
 
3. The Results of Anomalies 
 
  This section explains the results of the expected and discounted utility anomalies. In 
July 2008, we surveyed around 500 Japanese adults registered with a consumer 
monitoring investigative company. 253 were smokers, and 241 were non-smokers. 
Looking into the demographics, the male ratio was 56.3%, the average age was 39.3, the 
smoking rate was 51.2%, the drinking rate was 82.8%, the pachinko-playing rate was 
23.9%, and the horse-race betting rate was 24.5%. The basic statistics are summarized 
in Table 1. The respondents were classified, with respect to risk preferences, into 
expected (2Y/X = 1) and non-expected utility types (2Y/X < 1), which are indicated in 
the rows; and, with respect to time preferences, into the exponentially discounted (X/(Y 








discounted utility anomaly is 32.6%, while that of the expected utility anomaly is 42.5%. 
These are similar (though slightly higher) to the values (21.4%~32.4%) reported by 
Blondel et al. (2007). Note that the incidence rate of homo economicus—satisfying both 
the discounted and expected utility hypotheses—is 41.1%. On the other hand, the rate of 
incidence of non-homo economicus—violating both the discounted and expected utility 
hypotheses—is 16.2%. 
  Next, we divided the sample into two categories: (b) smokers and (c) non-smokers. 
The irrational addiction model assumes that addiction is the result of an anomaly. 
Therefore, the ratio of anomaly is expected to be higher among smokers. Do the results, 
then, uphold the assumption? The ratios of the expected utility anomaly are 44.7% for 
smokers and 40.2% for non-smokers. In addition, the ratios of the discounted utility 
anomaly are 35.2% for smokers and 29.9% for non-smokers. Although the results are 
observed to be along expected lines, we cannot conclude that the two categories 
(smokers and non-smokers) are statistically very different, which is again consistent 
with Blondel et al. (2007). Viewed from another angle, the ratios of homo 
economicus—satisfying both the discounted and expected utility hypotheses—are 
37.2% for smokers and 45.2% for non-smokers. Although these ratios are statistically 
notably different, the significance level is not high (the P value is 0.07). We may, 
therefore, conclude, but only marginally, that smokers tend to be irrational.  
  Finally, we divided the sample into two further categories: (d) pachinko and (e) 
non-pachinko. Pachinko has a different aspect to smoking, since the former is a type of 
process dependence, very distinct from the substance dependence on nicotine. The 
ratios of the expected utility anomaly are 44.1% for pachinko players and 42.0% for 
pachinko non-players. Further, the ratios of the discounted utility anomaly are 33.9% for 
pachinko and 32.2% for non-pachinko. Since the differences are not statistically 
significant 6
  The inveterate anomalies raise a question. Do anomalies deny the discounted and 
expected utility theories? Although the discounted and expected utility anomalies 
violate the stationarity axiom and the independence axiom necessary for these theories 
, we may conclude that those who play pachinko are not necessarily 
irrational. 
                                               
6The same thing applies for the differences between those who smoke and play 




to hold, we should not forget that we have so far dealt with the idiosyncratic cases such 
as the immediacy and certainty effects inducing anomalies. We consider at this point 
that measuring economic psychological parameters for time and risk preferences is still 
useful even if these anomalies occur7
 
. 
4. Conjoint Analysis of Time Preference and Risk Aversion 
 
  In this section, we explain conjoint analysis—a stated preference method that we 
carried out on 494 valid respondents to simultaneously measure time and risk 
preferences 8
 
. Conjoint analysis assumes that a service is a profile composed of 
attributes. If we include too many attributes and levels, respondents have difficulty 
answering the questions. On the other hand, if we include too few, the description of the 
alternatives becomes inadequate. After conducting several pretests, we determined the 
alternatives, attributes, and levels as follows: 
Alternative 1 
Reward, probability, and delay are fixed across profiles. 
Reward: JPY100,000 (US$909), Winning probability: 100%, Time delay: None. 
 
Alternative 2 
Reward, probability, and delay vary across profiles. 
Reward is either JPY150,000 (US$1,364), 200,000 (US$1,818), 250,000 
(US$2,273), or 300,000 (US$2,727). 
The winning probability is 40, 60, 80, or 90%. 
The time delay is 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, or 5 years. 
 
  Since the number of profiles becomes unmanageable if we consider all possible 
                                               
7Some models explaining anomalies may be compatible with the standard theories by a 
simple transformation of variables. For example, if psychological time is set as a 
logarithm of physical time, an exponential discounted model with respect to physical 
time can be transformed into a hyperbolic discounted model for psychological time 
(Takahashi 2005). 
8Andersen et al. (2008) discussed that allowing for risk aversion makes a significant 




combinations, we avoided this problem by adopting an orthogonal planning method. 





  Next, we explain the discounted and expected utility models that form the basis for 
estimating the time preference rates and the risk aversion coefficients. Let the utility of 
alternative i be Vi (rewardi, probabilityi, timedelayi). The exponentially discounted 
utility model and the (linear in probability) expected utility model are used to derive the 
functional form of Vi, as follows: 
 
Discounted utility: exp(–TIME * timedelayi) * utility(rewardi), 
where parameter TIME denotes the rate of time preference. 
Expected utility9
 
: probabilityi * utility(rewardi). 
Accordingly, rewriting Vi, we obtain 
 
Vi(rewardi, probabilityi, timedelayi) 
= exp(–TIME * timedelayi) * probabilityi * utility(rewardi). 
 
At this point, we simply specify the functional form of utility as the RISK-th power of 
reward. Such a utility function is called the constant relatively risk-averse form, where 
the coefficient of the relative risk aversion is denoted by 1-RISK. Taking the logarithms 
of both sides, we obtain 
 
ln Vi(rewardi, probabilityi, timedelayi) 
= –TIME * timedelayi + ln probabilityi + RISK * ln rewardi. 
 
                                               
9If we consider index s the state of nature, s = 1,…, S, the expected utility, is written as 
Σ s = 1,…, S probabilitys * utility(rewards). Note that here we simply assume that one 




Two points should be noted here: First, a greater level of impatience implies a larger 
TIME; second, since a risk-averse attitude is denoted by 1-RISK ∈ [0,1], a greater 
level of risk-aversion implies a larger value of 1-RISK. 
  Finally, we explain the estimation models. Conditional logit (CL) models, which 
assume independent and identical distribution (IID) of random terms, have been widely 
used in past studies. However, the property of independence from the irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), derived from the IID assumption of the CL model, is too strict to 
allow flexible substitution patterns. The most appropriate scheme, then, is a mixed logit 
(ML) model that accommodates differences in the variance of random components (or 
unobserved heterogeneity). These models are flexible enough to overcome the 
limitations of CL models by allowing random taste variation, unrestricted substitution 
patterns, and the correlation of random terms over time (McFadden and Train 2000). 
See the APPENDIX for details of ML models. 
  In what follows, we assume that the preference parameters regarding time and risk 
follow normal distribution. 
 
TIME (rate of time preference) 
RISK (coefficient of relative risk aversion represented by 1-RISK). 
 
  We can demonstrate variety in the parameters at the individual level, using the 
maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) method for estimation, by setting 100 Halton 
draws10
 
. Furthermore, with respondents answering eight questions in the conjoint 
analysis, the resultant data form a panel, allowing us the option to apply standard 
random effect estimation. We can now calculate the estimator of the conditional mean 
of the random parameters at the individual level. 
5. The Estimation Results of Conjoint Analysis 
 
  In this section, the rate of time preference and the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
                                               
10The adoption of the Halton sequence draw is an important issue to be examined 
(Halton 1960). Bhat (2001) found that 100 Halton sequence draws are more efficient 




are measured simultaneously on the basis of the estimation results. Having assumed that 
the random parameters follow normal distribution, their means and standard deviations 
are reported. The estimation results are displayed in Table 2, separately, for the "both 
discounted & expected utility" samples (203), and for the "both non-discounted & 
non-expected utility" samples (80). The means and standard deviations of both TIME 
(the time preference parameter) and RISK (the risk preference parameter) are 
statistically significant. The time preference rate is 5.05% for the "both discounted & 
expected utility" type and 8.14% for the "both non-discounted & non-expected utility" 
type. The risk aversion coefficient is –7.54%11
 
 for the "both discounted & expected 
utility" type, and 19.69% for the "both non-discounted & non-expected utility" type. 
Since the volume of estimation results is enormous, we omit other estimations and 
display only the time preference rates and risk aversion coefficients below. 
<Table 2> 
 
  Based on the estimation results, we measured the time preference rates and the risk 
aversion coefficients for various cases. The results, covering all of the sample data, are 
indicated in Table 3. Table 3(a) displays the means and standard errors of the time 
preference rates for the discounted (333 samples) and non-discounted utility types (161 
samples). Table 3(b) displays the means and standard errors of the risk aversion 
coefficients for the expected (284 samples) and non-expected utility types (210 
samples). Table 3(c) displays the means and standard errors of the time preference rates 
and risk aversion coefficients for the "both discounted & expected utility" type (203 




  Similarly, the results for the smokers and non-smokers are indicated in Tables 4 and 5. 
Furthermore, the results for the pachinko players and non-pachinko players are 
indicated in Tables 6 and 7. 
                                               











6. Anomaly and Impulsivity for All Data 
 
  In this section, we investigate the relationship between anomaly and impulsivity for 
all the data. We begin by building certain hypotheses and verifying them. The 
discounted utility anomaly can be explained by the immediacy effect, since the serious 
consideration of immediacy represents a preference ruled by impatience and therefore 
implies a higher time preference rate. Likewise, the expected utility anomaly can be 
explained by the certainty effect, since the serious consideration of certainty represents 
a preference for risk aversion and therefore implies a higher risk aversion coefficient12
 
. 
Hypothesis 1.1: Time preference rates will be higher for the non-discounted utility 
type than for the discounted utility type. 
Result 1.1: Yes. The time preference rates are 5.14% for the discounted utility type 
and 7.44% for the non-discounted utility type (see Table 3(a)). Based on the test of 
difference in the mean values, the t-value is 23.73; the time preference rates are 
significantly different between the discounted and the non-discounted utility types. 
 
Hypothesis 1.2: Risk aversion coefficients will be higher for the non-expected 
utility type than for the expected utility type. 
Result 1.2: Yes. The risk aversion coefficients are –0.89% for the expected utility 
type and 14.45% for the non-expected utility type (see Table 3(b)). Since the 
t-value is 16.86, the risk aversion coefficients are significantly different between 
the expected and the non-expected utility types. 
                                               
12Risk anomaly can perhaps be attributed to the certainty effect and be interpreted as 
loss aversion. It still remains unclear why risk preference appears to be more 





  As expected, it follows that the discounted utility anomaly is associated with 
impatience (and higher time preference rates), while the expected utility anomaly is 
related to the preference for risk aversion (and higher risk aversion coefficients). The 
former result with respect to time preference is consistent with the previous literature, 
thereby, indicating that smokers tend to discount both hyperbolically and myopically 
(Kirby et al. 1999). 
  On the other hand, the interpretation of the latter result with respect to risk preference 
is difficult, because the expected utility anomaly is associated with risk-averse 
preferences and is not necessarily impulsive. This may account for the well-known fact 
that, contrary to expectations, smokers do not always discount risk more heavily than 
non-smokers. This phenomenon ought to be examined later in detail, having been noted 
by various previous studies.13
  Let us here compare homo economicus (consistent with both the discounted and 
expected utility hypotheses) and non-homo economicus (exhibiting both the discounted 
and expected anomalies). Observations similar to Results 1.1 and 1.2 are assured.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1.3: Higher time preference rates and higher risk aversion coefficients 
will be found for the "both non-discounted & non-expected utility" type than for the 
"discounted & expected utility" type. 
Result 1.3: Yes. The time preference rate is 8.14% and the risk aversion coefficient 
is 19.69% for the "both non-discounted & non-expected utility" type, while for the 
"both discounted & expected utility" type, the time preference rate is 5.05% and 
the risk aversion coefficient is –7.54% (see Table 3(c)). Since the t-values are 
14.69 for the time preference rates and 13.28 for the risk aversion coefficients, it 
may be asserted that the time and risk preferences are significantly different 
between the two types. 
 
  Finally, we may conclude that the discounted utility anomaly is associated with 
higher time preference rates, and the expected utility anomaly is connected with higher 
risk aversion coefficients. 
                                               





7. Anomaly and Impulsivity for Smokers 
 
  In this section, we investigate the relationship between anomaly and impulsivity for 
smokers and non-smokers. Table 4 displays the means and standard errors of the time 
preference rates and the risk aversion coefficients for smokers: the time preference rates 
for the discounted utility type (164 samples) and the non-discounted utility type (89 
samples); the risk aversion coefficients for the expected utility type (140 samples) and 
the non-expected utility type (113 samples); the "both discounted & expected utility" 
type (94 samples) and the "both non-discounted & non-expected utility" type (43 
samples). Table 5 also displays the means and standard errors of the time preference 
rates and the risk aversion coefficients for non-smokers. It is easily verified that 
Hypotheses 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 can be reproduced. 
  Following Ida and Goto (2009 in press), we simultaneously measured the time 
preference rates and the risk aversion coefficients. We, therefore, expect identical 
conclusions to those obtained in Ida and Goto, that smokers are impatient and 
risk-seeking (see also Mitchell 1999, Bickel et al. 1999, Odum et al. 2002, Baker et al. 
2003, Reynolds et al. 2004, Ohmura et al. 2005). We are here concerned with the 
following differences in the time preference rates: first, between the discounted utility 
smokers and the same type non-smokers; and second, between the non-discounted 
utility smokers and the same type non-smokers. Similarly, we examine the differences 
in the risk aversion coefficients: first, between the expected utility smokers and the 
same type non-smokers, and second, between the non-expected utility smokers and the 
same type non-smokers. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Time preference rates will be higher for discounted utility smokers 
than for the same type non-smokers. 
Result 2.1: Yes. The time preference rates are 5.81% for the discounted utility 
smokers and 5.15% for the same type non-smokers (see Tables 4(a) and 5(a)). 
Since the t-value is 7.06, the time preference rates are significantly different 
between the smokers and non-smokers within the discounted utility type. 
 




smokers than for the same type non-smokers. 
Result 2.2: Yes. The time preference rates are 9.03% for the non-discounted utility 
smokers and 5.67% for the same type non-smokers (see Tables 4(a) and 5(a)). 
Since the t-value is 12.05, the time preference rates are significantly different 
between the non-discounted utility smokers and the non-smokers of the same type. 
 
  These conclusions for time preference rates are as expected. Note that the difference 
between the non-discounted utility smokers and non-smokers (Result 2.2) is larger than 
that between the discounted utility smokers and non-smokers (Result 2.1). 
 
Hypothesis 2.3: The risk aversion coefficients will be lower for the expected utility 
smokers than for the same type non-smokers. 
Result 2.3: No. The risk aversion coefficients are 1.21% for the expected utility 
smokers and –1.21% for the same type non-smokers (see Tables 4(b) and 5(b)). 
Since the t-value is 1.53, the risk aversion coefficients are not significantly 
different between the expected utility smokers and the non-smokers of the same 
type. 
 
Hypothesis 2.4: Risk aversion coefficients will be lower for non-expected utility 
smokers than for the same type non-smokers. 
Result 2.4: Yes. The risk aversion coefficients are 8.91% for the non-expected 
utility smokers and 15.31% for the same type non-smokers (see Tables 4(b) and 
5(b)). Since the t-value is 3.29, the risk aversion coefficients are significantly 
different between the non-expected utility smokers and the same type 
non-smokers. 
 
  These results for the risk aversion coefficients are only partly as expected; smokers 
are more risk-averse than non-smokers only when the expected utility anomaly occurs 
(Result 2.4). 
  To check the robustness of these results, let us compare homo economicus (consistent 
with both discounted & expected utility hypotheses) and non-homo economicus 





Hypothesis 2.5: Hypotheses 2.1-2.4 will hold when comparing smokers and 
non-smokers. 
Result 2.5: No (2.1), Yes (2.2-2.4). Only Hypothesis 2.1 does not stand verified; 
the time preference rates are 5.03% for the "both discounted & expected utility" 
smokers and 5.11% for the same type non-smokers (see Tables 4(c) and 5(c)). 
Since the t-value is 0.5368, the time preferences are not significantly different 
between the "both discounted & expected utility" smokers and non-smokers. On 
the other hand, Hypotheses 2.2-2.4 are verified. Their t-values are 3.53, 7.19, and 
3.55. 
 
  To summarize these results, when the discounted and/or expected utility anomalies 
occur, the time preference rates are higher and the risk aversion coefficients are lower 
for smokers than for non-smokers 14
 
. As such, the grounds for addiction are 
simultaneously provided by the weak rationality and the irrationality approaches. An 
important question here is whether impulsivity and anomaly work complementarily or 
as substitutes of each other. Our findings indicate that the two approaches are 
complementary, which is consistent with Gruber and Koszegi (2001). 
8. Anomaly and Impulsivity for Pachinko 
 
  Section 7 dealt with smoking as an addiction and discussed the possible 
complementarities between impulsivity and anomaly for smokers. While smoking is a 
form of substance dependence that physiologically influences people’s preferences, it 
has been pointed out that preferences are affected not only by substance dependence but 
also by process dependence as well. It has also been reported that cross addiction exists 
among such activities as smoking, drinking, and gambling (Pierani and Tiezzi 2008; Ida 
and Goto 2007). As such, this section addresses pachinko, a type of Japanese pinball, as 
a process addiction. If the results obtained in the previous section hold for the pachinko 
process dependence, we may judge that our results apply widely across different 
addiction forms15
                                               
14Note, on the other hand, that when the discounted and/or expected utility anomalies do 
not operate, smokers are not necessarily impulsive. 
. 





Hypothesis 3.1: Time preference rates will be higher for discounted utility 
pachinko players than for the same type pachinko non-players. 
Result 3.1: Yes. The time preference rates are 7.45% for discounted utility 
pachinko players and 5.08% for the same type pachinko non-players (see Tables 
6(a) and 7(a)). Since the t-value is 12.39, the time preference rates are significantly 
different between the players and non-players within the discounted utility type. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: Time preference rates will be higher for non-discounted utility 
pachinko players than for the same type pachinko non-players. 
Result 3.2: Yes. The time preference rates are 9.76% for non-discounted utility 
pachinko players and 6.14% for the same type pachinko non-players (see Tables 
6(a) and 7(a)). Since the t-value is 7.18, the time preference rates are significantly 
different between the non-discounted utility pachinko players and non-players. 
 
  First, we observed that the results obtained for smokers with respect to the time 
preference rates hold for pachinko players as well. Next, we investigate the risk 
aversion coefficients. 
 
Hypothesis 3.3: Risk aversion coefficients will be lower for expected utility 
pachinko players than for the same type pachinko non-players. 
Result 3.3: Yes. The risk aversion coefficients are 6.01% for expected utility 
pachinko players and 0.10% for the same type pachinko non-players (see Tables 
6(b) and 7(b)). Since the t-value is 2.19, the risk aversion coefficients are 
significantly different between the expected utility pachinko players and 
non-players. 
 
Hypothesis 3.4: Risk aversion coefficients will be lower for non-expected utility 
pachinko players than for the same type non-players. 
Result 3.4: No. The risk aversion coefficients are 10.21% for non-expected utility 
                                                                                                                                         
the ability to obtain “something for nothing” (2008). Also, the relationship between 




pachinko players and 12.20% for the same type non-players (see Tables 7(b) and 
7(b)). Since the t-value is 0.63, the risk aversion coefficients are not significantly 
different between the non-expected utility pachinko players and non-players. 
 
  Contrary to Result 2.4 for smoking, Result 3.4, concerning the risk aversion 
coefficients of the non-expected utility pachinko players and non-players, did not 
support the hypothesis. Although the exact background of this result remains indistinct, 
it is at least certain that, overall, the complementarities between impulsivity and 
anomaly are less obvious for risk preference than they are for time preference. 
  To check the robustness of these results, we may again compare homo economicus 
(consistent with both discounted and expected utility hypotheses) and non-homo 
economicus (exhibiting both discounted and expected anomalies). 
 
Hypothesis 3.5: Hypotheses 3.1-3.4 will hold when comparing pachinko players 
and non-players. 
Result 3.5: Yes. Hypotheses 3.1-3.4 are verified at least at the 10% significance 
level (see Tables 6(c) and 7(c)). Their t-values are 6.71, 7.69, 9.71, and 1.76. 
 
  The results obtained for pachinko (Result 3.5) are more robust than those for smoking 
(Result 2.5), and all the expected results are reproduced for pachinko. On the whole, the 
time preference rates were higher among the non-discounted utility addicts, for such 




  We have so far seen that addiction can be explained both on the grounds of 
impulsivity (higher time preference and lower risk aversion) and anomaly 
(non-discounted and non-expected utilities). The question then arises as to why 
impulsivity and anomaly complementarily account for addiction. This section will 
discuss certain insights into addiction that were gained using the socio-economic model 
advocated by Tomer (2001). 
The socio-economic approach assumes that people who become addicts suffer from 




activities. When a person’s degree of imbalance reaches a certain threshold and the 
individual finds an addictive good that restores a sense of balance, addiction is likely to 
be formed. 
Five external and internal influences determine an individual’s degree of imbalance: 
1) the individual’s personal capital, 2) the individual’s social capital, 3) the individual’s 
consumption capital, 4) the societal and community influences on the individual, and 5) 
the stressfulness of the individual’s current life situation. Among the five factors above, 
the individual’s personal capital endowment is the most important factor; the others 
serve to moderate or exacerbate the imbalance. 
Personal capital is defined as the human capacity that derives itself from an 
individual’s basic personal qualities. An important component of personal capital is 
emotional intelligence, which determines one’s ability to motivate him/herself, to persist 
in the face of frustrations, to control impulses, to delay gratification, to regulate one’s 
mood, and so on.  
At this point, we can integrate Tomer’s socio-economic model and our 
economic-psychological model. The economic-psychological parameters of impulsivity 
and anomaly reflect the degrees of imbalance. When one fails to control oneself, the 
time preference rate is higher and the risk aversion coefficient is lower; at the same time, 
one tends to demonstrate non-discounted and non-expected utility behavior.  
In sum, an individual with a significant imbalance is likely to manifest defective 
mental processing (imbalance) that leads to a biased perception of the expected benefits 
and costs of an addictive behavior. The degree of imbalance can be represented by 
impulsivity and anomaly. When the bias caused by impulsivity and anomaly is strong, 
the individual is oriented to perceiving the use of an addictive good favorably. Figure 2 




Finally, we discuss briefly the self-control issues. When discussing these, we should 
differentiate meta-preferences from actual preferences (Tomer 1996). While one’s actual 
preferences are innately determined, they are also influenced by the degree to which one 
has developed the capacity to appreciate goods. On the other hand, one’s 




judgments of a higher order self. Meta-preferences are derived from our wise, rational, 
and long-term oriented contemplation and are, thus, often in conflict with our actual 
preferences. If one has a good meta-preference that is strong enough to restrain a bad 
actual preference, one’s socio-economic preferences will become time-patient, 
risk-averse, and of discounted- and expected-utility types. It is thus natural that 
ex-addicts who have overcome their past addictive behaviors are the most rational (Ida 




  Two approaches explain addiction: weak rationality and anomaly. The former 
assumes that smokers have higher time preference rates and lower risk aversion 
coefficients—a condition that may also be termed as impulsive preference. On the other 
hand, the latter approach argues that addiction results from anomalies such as 
non-discounted or non-expected utility. In this paper, we investigated whether these two 
approaches were complementary or substitutes. We found that they are complementary 
and may thus conclude that anomaly is compatible with impulsivity. In addition, the 
time preference rates were found to be higher for discounted utility addicts than for the 
same type non-addicts, and the same thing holds true for non-discounted utility addicts 
and non-addicts. However, the conclusions concerning risk aversion coefficients are less 
stark between addicts and non-addicts. Ultimately, on the subject of future research, an 
important premise could be set up by the question: Why is risk preference more 





APPENDIX ML Model 
 
  Assuming that parameter  βn  is distributed with density function f (βn )  (Train 2003, 
Louviere et al. 2000), the ML specification allows for repeated choices by each sampled 
decision maker in such a way that the coefficients vary over people but are constant 
over choice situations for each person. The logit probability of decision maker n 
choosing alternative i in choice situation t is expressed as 
 
Lnit (βn ) = [exp(Vnit (βn )) / exp(Vnjt (βn ))j=1
J∑ ]t=1
T∏ , 
which is the product of normal logit formulas, given parameter βn , the observable 
portion of utility function Vnit , and alternatives j=1, …, J in choice situations t = 1, …, T. 
Therefore, ML choice probability is a weighted average of logit probability  Lnit (βn )  
evaluated at parameter  βn  with density function f (βn ) , which can be written as 
 
Pnit = Lnit (βn ) f (βn )d∫ βn . 
  In the linear-in-parameter form, the utility function can be written as 
 Unit = γ ' xnit + βn ' znit + εnit , 
where  xnit  and  znit  denote observable variables, γ denotes a fixed parameter vector, 
 βn denotes a random parameter vector, and  εnit  denotes an independently and 
identically distributed extreme value (IIDEV) term. 
  Since ML choice probability is not expressed in closed form, simulations need to be 
performed for the ML model estimation (see Train 2003, p. 148 for details). We can also 
calculate the estimator of the conditional mean of the random parameters, conditioned 
on individual specific choice profile yn , given as 
 
h(β | yn ) = [P( yn | β) f (β)] / P( yn | β) f (β)dβ∫ . 
  Here, we assume that preference parameters regarding time and risk follow normal 
distribution: 
TIME (rate of time preference) 
RISK (coefficient of relative risk aversion represented by 1-RISK). 
  The random utility that person n obtains from choosing alternative i in choice 




 Unit = −α *TIME * timedelaynit +α * ln probabilitynit +α * RISK * ln rewardnit + εnit ,  
where is a scale parameter that is not separately identified from free parameters and is 




                                               
16 Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000, pp. 142–143) showed that variance is an inverse 
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Figure 1: Representative questionnaire 
 
   ALTERNATIVE 1   ALTERNATIVE 2 
REWARD   JPY 100,000   JPY 250,000 
TIME DELAY   NOW   1 MONTH LATER 
WINNING PROBABILITY   100%   80% 
  ↓  ↓ 





Table 1: Expected and Discounted Utilities Anomalies 
 
(a) All samples data Time discounting 
  Discounted utility Non-discounted utility 
Total 
  X/(Y-1)=1 X/(Y-1)<1 
Risk 
discounting 
Expected utility 203 81 284 
2Y/X=1 41.1% 16.4% 57.5% 
Non-expected utility 130 80 210 
2Y/X<1 26.3% 16.2% 42.5% 
Total 
333 161 494 






(b) Smokers Time discounting 
 Discounted utility Discounted utility Non-discounted utility 
Total 
  X/(Y-1)=1 X/(Y-1)<1 
Risk 
discounting 
Expected utility 94 46 140 
2Y/X=1 37.2% 18.2% 55.3% 
Non-expected utility 70 43 113 
2Y/X<1 27.7% 17.0% 44.7% 
Total 
164 89 253 
64.8% 35.2% 100% 
     
(c) Non-smokers Time discounting 
 Discounted utility Discounted utility Non-discounted utility 
Total 
  X/(Y-1)=1 X/(Y-1)<1 
Risk 
discounting 
Expected utility 109 35 144 
2Y/X=1 45.2% 14.5% 59.8% 
Non-expected utility 60 37 97 
2Y/X<1 24.9% 15.4% 40.2% 
Total 
169 72 241 






(d) Pachinko Time discounting 
 Discounted utility Discounted utility Non-discounted utility 
Total 
 X/(Y-1)=1 X/(Y-1)=1 X/(Y-1)<1 
Risk 
discounting 
Expected utility 49 17 66 
2Y/X=1 41.5% 14.4% 55.9% 
Non-expected utility 29 23 52 
2Y/X<1 24.6% 19.5% 44.1% 
Total 
78 40 118 
66.1% 33.9% 100% 
     
(e) Non-pachinko Time discounting 
 Total Discounted utility Non-discounted utility 
Total 
  X/(Y-1)=1 X/(Y-1)<1 
Risk 
discounting 
Expected utility 154 64 218 
2Y/X=1 41.0% 17.0% 58.0% 
Non-expected utility 101 57 158 
2Y/X<1 26.9% 15.2% 42.0% 
Total 
255 121 376 





Table 2: Estimation Results of Conjoint Analysis 
 
 
No. of Samples 203*8 80*8
Maximum LL -866.5 -314.3
Initial LL -1125.7 -443.6










Note: Coefficients in the upper row, standard errors (S.E.) in the lower
row, *** at the 1% significance level,  ** at the 5% significance level,
*at the 10% significance level.
Non-discounted &
non-expected utility
RISK (S.D.) *** ***































Standard error 0.0069 0.0183
Mean -0.0754 0.1969









































Standard error 0.0103 0.0235
Mean -0.0122 0.1299









































Standard error 0.0095 0.0384
Mean -0.1699 0.3547









































Standard error 0.0199 0.0435
Mean 0.0396 0.2928









































Standard error 0.0072 0.0183
Mean -0.1264 0.1661















External and Internal Influences: 
1) Personal Capital 
2) Consumption Capital 
3) Social Capital 
4) Society and Community 
5) Current Life Situation 
Degree of Imbalance 
Represented by Economic-Psychological Parameters: 
1) Time Preference 
2) Risk preference 
3) Time Inconsistency 
4) Risk Inconsistency 
Bias in Perception of Benefits and Costs 
Addiction or Not 
